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  This paper investigates how the soft budget constraint with grants from the 
central government to local governments tends to exaggerate inefficient local 
expenditures. We first develop a theoretical model, which explains soft budget 
problem in a multi-government setting. We then show that in Japan’s case local 
governments implemented inefficient public investments and hence the bad 
outcome of soft budget problem occurred in the 1990s.         
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1. Introduction 
  This paper investigates how local governments increase inefficient local 
public expenditures by highlighting the soft-budget constraint of grants from the 
central (or federal) government to subnational governments (hereafter local 
governments).  Namely, this paper will analyze theoretically the soft-budget effect 
of intergovernmental financing on local expenditures by developing a simple game 
between the two governments with the overlapping tax bases between them and 
then will evaluate empirically the growing dependence on transfers for covering 
local public investment from the viewpoint of intergovernmental financing for 
Japan’s  case.   
  It is well recognized that if local governments face soft budget constraints, 
they will have an incentive to over-spend, over-borrow, and/or pay insufficient 
attention to the quality of the investments that their borrowing finances.  Such 
over-spending/borrowing can occur through the common pool mechanism. See, for 
example, Wildasin (1997, 2004), Goodspeed (2002), Akai and Sato (2005) among 
others.  That is, the natural conjecture is that if the central government imposes 
hard budget constraints, inefficient investment should not arise. However, recently 
Besfamille and Lockwood (2004) show that hard budget constraints can be too hard 
and discourage investment that is socially efficient.  Namely, they point out the 
possibility that the hard budget constraint over-incentives the soft budget 
constraint to provide effort by penalizing it too much for project failure, thus leading 
ultimately to the possibility that socially efficient projects may not be undertaken.     
In this paper without incorporating any uncertainty or imperfect 
information of effort with respect to public investment and other government 
activities, we develop a simple game theoretic model of the central and local 
governments, which shows that while the hard budget constraint does not 
necessarily realize the first best solution, the soft budget constraint may or may not 
be better off than the hard budget constraint case, depending on the initial size of 
hard budget constraint and the optimizing behavior of central government with 
respect to intergovernmental transfers. 
  We pay attention to the vertical externality of shared tax bases between the 
central and local governments. Multileveled government normally means some 
commonality of tax base between central and local governments. As a result the tax 
base may overlap and shared tax bases create another type of common pool problem.   
It is now well recognized that vertical externalities are likely to leave local taxes too 
high.  This is because each local government unduly discounts the pressure on 
central government’s spending it creates by raising its own tax rate.    See Keen and 
Kotsogiannis (2002), Keen (1998), and Wilson (1999) among others. In this paper we 
do not consider such vertical/horizontal tax competition between central and local 
governments and would simply assume that tax rates are given for central and local   4
governments. Rather, we would like to focus on another inefficiency of local 
expenditures due to overlapping tax bases.   
By assuming that the tax share is exogenously given, we incorporate two 
sources of inefficiency. First, the distribution of public spending between the central 
and local governments is not necessarily determined optimally.    If the tax share to 
the central government is too high, the size of local public spending is too low (and 
vice versa). Second, local public investment may have a positive vertical externality 
effect. Namely, if an increase in local expenditure on infrastructure stimulates 
macroeconomic activities, it may enlarge the overlapping tax base, which would 
then increase taxes for the central government at the given share of tax base 
between two governments.  This is a positive spillover of vertical externality.  In 
this sense, the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium level of local public investment is 
too low.   
Under these two inefficiencies in a two period model the benevolent central 
government may have an incentive to stimulate local expenditure in period 2 by 
means of additional grants ex post. However, such additional grants could produce 
soft budget problems by increasing grants when the local government spends and 
borrows more in period 1 because local borrowing more in period 1 means a decline 
in local public goods in period 2 and hence upsets the central government's optimal 
allocation strategy.   
  This paper consists of five sections.  In Section 2,  we develop a 
theoretical model of the central and local governments and investigate the subgame 
perfect equilibrium to explore the soft-budget problem with vertical externality of 
overlapping tax bases.    Then we summarize Japanese intergovernmental financing 
policy in the recent years and discuss soft-budget constraints between the central 
and local governments in Japan’s case in Section 3.    Based on our theoretical model, 
we implement time series analyses concerning local public finance and 
macroeconomic activities in Section 4.  Namely, we investigate how the bad 
outcome of soft-budget constraints is relevant in the real economy by empirically 
studying the impact of intergovernmental grants on local expenditures in Japan’s 
case. Finally, we present some concluding remarks in Section 5. 
 
2. Analytical Model of Central and Local Governments 
2.1 Model 
  We develop a two-period intergovernmental financing model of two 
governments, the central government (or CG), the lower-level local government (or 
LG) in a small open economy, in order to explain how local public expenditures may 
be over-provided under the soft-budget constraint.  For simplicity, we consider the 
representative local government, and do not consider the free-riding and/or spillover 
effects within local governments. This is just an assumption for simplicity. There   5
are many papers to explore the horizontal and vertical externalities due to 
non-cooperative competition among local governments.  See Wilson (1999) among 
others. As shown in Appendix, the analytical results would be qualitatively the 
same even if we consider non-cooperative behavior of multi-local governments. 
Moreover, in Japan’s case, many local governments behave cooperatively and their 
behavior may be summarized by the representative local government (the Ministry 
of Home Affairs), which is in particular a good approximation of Japan’s case. 
The representative local government (LG) provides local public goods g t, 
and the central government (CG) provides nation-wide public goods Gt in each 
period. Each public good is beneficial and its utility is given by a twice-continuously 
differentiable and strictly quasi-concave function. Moreover, we assume that all 
goods are normal ones.  The relative price of each good is set to be unity for 
simplicity.  Thus, the social welfare W, which reflects the representative agent’s 
preferences over public goods, is given by 
  W = )} ( ) ( { ) ( ) ( 2 2 1 1 g v G u g v G u + + + δ      (1) 
where 0 < δ <1 is a discount factor. For simplicity, private consumption is assumed 
to be fixed and hence we only consider the utility from public goods. 
  The local government also conducts public investment k in period 1, which 
has a productive effect of raising tax revenue in period 2. Let Yt represent total tax 
revenue of the two governments in period t ( t = 1, 2).  We assume that Y1 is 
exogenously given but Y2 is dependent on public works conducted by the local 
government in period 1.   ) ( 1 2 k f Y Y + = .  k denotes local public investment in 
period 1, which would increase total tax revenue of period 2.  Investment product 
function f( ) satisfies the standard Inada condition: f’( )>0, f”( )<0. For simplicity we 
do not consider public investment by the central government. We do not also 
consider pork barrel spending by the local government.   As shown in DelRossi and 
Inman (1999), it is well recognized that pork barrel projects are too high due to 
subsidies from the central government caused by local governments’ political 
demand. It is theoretically obvious that wasteful projects are too high due to the 
political pressure. In this paper we consider nation-widely beneficial local public 
investment.  In a multi-local government setting local public investment does not 
have spillover effects over regions.    Still it has the vertical externality effect on the 
central government’s tax revenue. Nevertheless, we show that public investment 
may be over-provided under the soft budget constraint. 
  Next, we specify each government's budget constraint.  Both central and 
local governments levy taxes on overlapping economic activities.  Since the tax 
base is overlapping, the tax revenue may be shared by the two governments. We set 
β as local government’s portion of total tax revenue, 0<β <1. The central government 
gains a portion of the total tax revenue.  Thus 1 – β means share of the central 
government to total tax revenue.  The share parameter β is assumed to be   6
exogenously given and constant over time.   
  The period-by-period budget constraints of CG are given as follows, 
  1 1 1 ) 1 ( Y Z G B β − − + =        (2-1) 
  2 2 2 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( Y B r Z G β − = + + +       (2-2) 
where Zt is grants from the central government to the local government in period t.  
B is the central government debt.    r >0 is the exogenously given world interest rate. 
  The period-by-period budget constraints of LG are given as follows, 
  1 1 1 Y Z k g D β − − + =        (3-1) 
  22 2 (1 ) gr D Z Y β ++ = +        (3-2) 
where  D  is the local government debt.     
From (2) and (3) we can rewrite the intertemporal budget constraints of the 
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2.2 Unitary Government 
  First of all, we investigate the Pareto efficient first best allocation in this 
model as a benchmark.  Since we do not incorporate any uncertainty or imperfect 
information with respect to public investment and other government activities in 
the unitary system, unitary government, consolidating CG and LG, could attain the 
first best by allocating optimally the total tax revenues among nation-wide public 
goods and local public goods in each period.    Namely, the unitary government, who 
implements the optimal allocation {, , } tt Ggk, maximizes social welfare (1) subject 
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which is obtained from (2-3) and (3-3) by eliminating  β  and  12 , Z Z . 
First order conditions of this optimization problem are as follows, 
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µ is the Lagrangian multiplier of equation (4).    From these conditions we have 
  1 1 G g u v =        (5-1) 
  22 Gg uv =         ( 5 - 2 )












G + = =        (5-3) 
  r k f + = ′ 1 ) (         (5-4) 
The above optimality conditions (5-1,.,4) and the feasibility condition (4) determine 
the Pareto efficient allocation as the benchmark case. Conditions (5-1)(5-2) mean 
that the marginal benefit of pubic goods is equalized between CG and LG. Condition 
(5-3) governs the standard (intertemporal) optimal allocation of public spending 
between two periods.  Finally, condition (5-4) is the standard first-best criterion of 
public investment.   
 
 
2.3 Outcome in a Decentralized System 
  We now investigate whether the first best solution is obtained in a 
multi-government non-cooperative world where central and local governments 
decide their policy variables non-cooperatively.  Suppose first of all the fully (or 
isolated) decentralized Nash equilibrium at the exogenously given β >0, where 
there is no intergovernmental transfer between CG and LG;  12 0 ZZ == . CG 
maximizes (1) subject to (2-3) by choosing nation wide public goods while assuming 
local public goods fixed.  Similarly, LG maximizes (1) subject to (3-3) by choosing 
local public goods and investment, while assuming nation-wide public goods fixed. 
Then, first order conditions of this Nash non-cooperative equilibrium are as follows, 
  1 0 G u −Ψ=  
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where  Ψ  and ψ are the Lagrangian multipliers of equations (2-3) and (3-3) with 

















+ ′ = >1 + r       (6-2) 
Condition (6-1), which is the same as (5-3), implies that relative 
(intertemporal) allocation between g1 and g2 as well as relative (intertemporal) 
allocation between G1 and G2 is efficient. But the levels of these public goods and 
local investment are not necessarily provided optimally.    In other words, conditions 
















, are arbitrarily set, depending on the exogenous parameter,  β .  
Moreover, (6-2) means that k is under-provided due to the overlapping tax 
base;  β <1.  Condition (5-4) does not hold. Since the local government does not 
take into account the positive spillover effect of increasing the overlapping tax base 
on public goods provided by the central government, local public investment 
provided by the local government is not sufficient and total tax revenue shared by 
both governments in period 2 is inefficiently low.     
There are two sources of inefficiency in the decentralized system.  First, β 
is not necessarily set at the optimal level and hence the allocation of public 
spending between CG and LG is not determined optimally.    In this paper we do not 
consider the possibility of choosing β optimally. Second, there is a vertical 
externality of public investment due to the overlapping tax base.    So long as  1 β < , 
(6-2) implies that k is too low.     
It should be noted that although the first distortion may be corrected by a 
lump-sum transfer between CG and LG, the second distortion cannot be corrected 
by a lump-sum transfer alone. We need a non-lump sum intergovernmental transfer 
scheme from the central government to the local government to stimulate public 
investment  k. We also consider the possibility of making additional lump-sum 
grants from CG to LG in period 2, and it may create the soft budget problem. In 
section 2.4 we develop a simple game between CG and LG to explore the bad 
outcome of soft budget problems for Japan’s case. 
 
2.4 Non-Lump Sum Transfer 
2.4.1 Analytical Framework of IGT 
  From now on we consider an intergovernmental grant transfer scheme 
(IGT) from CG to LG. Generally,  12 , Z Z  may be functions of g1, g2, k, Y1, and Y2. An 
example of the simplest scheme would be   9
  1 ˆ pkZ =          (7-1) 
  2 0 Z =          (7-2) 
where the transfer in period 1 is increasing with local public investment, while 
there is no transfer in period 2.  We will assume this simple scheme in the 
following game. In section 3.3 we consider another example of IGT scheme, which is 
more relevant for Japan’s case.  The analytical results are qualitatively the same 
as in the simple scheme of (7.1)(7.2). 
  The local government, which receives IGT Grants, faces budget constraint 
(3-1), (3-2), (7-1) and (7-2).  Then we have as the local government budget 
constraint in the IGT system 
  12
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2.4.2 Game between Two Governments 
2.4.2.1    Structure of the games 
We consider the following two games; 
Game I) 
CG is the leader and LG is the follower. The game is done at the beginning 
of period 1. Namely, at the first stage CG determines IGT parameter  ˆ p  and  public 
goods  12 , GG with regarding g1 and g2 fixed, and then at the second stage LG 
determines its expenditures,  12 ,, ggk .  
 
Game II)   
LG is the leader and CG is the follower. And, IGT parameter  ˆ p and public 
goods  1 G are exogenously set at the levels given by solutions of Game I. Namely, the 
first stage of this game is done at the beginning of period 1, where LG determines 
its expenditures of period 1,  1, gk . Then, the second stage of this game is done at 
the end of period 1, where CG chooses additional grants, A, as well as  22 , Gg . In 
this sense this game becomes a soft-budget game. 
 
The relation between these two games is explained as follows. Note that β 
is not necessarily set at the optimal level. Hence, when Game I is over and the 
second period comes, the central government may not want to commit to the 
determined level of  β  at the beginning of period 2 and now may want to transfer 
an additional amount A in period 2 to maximize social welfare ex-post.   
 
2.4.2.2  Game  I   10
Second Stage 
  In Game I LG faces the hard-budget constraint.  We first investigate the 
optimizing behavior of LG at the second stage, which occurs at the beginning of the 
first period.  As explained above, LG regards nation-wide public goods as fixed 
when LG maximizes utility (1). It follows that the local government maximizes the 
objective function (1) subject to (8) at given levels of tax share parameter β, IGT 
parameter,  ˆ p , and nation wide public goods, G1 and G2.   
Therefore, the first order conditions with respect to its policy variables, g1, 
g2, and k are respectively given as follows, 
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     (9-3) 
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier of constraint (8).  From these conditions we 
have 
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=+        (10-2) 
Equation (10-1) governs the intertemporal allocation of g1 and g2, and equation 
(10-2) determines k at given levels of tax share parameter β and IGT parameter, ˆ p . 
From these conditions (10-1,2) and the budget constraint (8), we may derive 
the response functions of local government. 
  11ˆ (,) gp β =Γ         ( 1 1 - 1 )  
  22ˆ (,) gp β =Γ         ( 1 1 - 2 )  
  ˆ (,) kK p β =         ( 1 1 - 3 )  
An increase in  ˆ p  will raise local expenditures. An increase in β  would also 
stimulate local expenditures. These results are intuitively appealing. 
 
First Stage 
  At the first stage of Game I, the central government maximizes the 
national welfare (1) subject to its budget constraints (2-3), (7-1,2), and the response 
functions of local government (11-1,2,3) by choosing IGT parameter,  ˆ p , as well as 
nation-wide public spending G1,  G2 and public debt B.  Although the central 
government can effectively control local expenditures based on (11) by choosing the 
IGT parameter, it may not realize the first best allocation by setting policy variables   11
appropriately.  Namely, the central government may not attain (5-1) - (5-4) at the 
same time by choosing  12 ˆ ,, GG p  appropriately.   
This is because the size of tax share in each period is exogenously given as β 








 is also exogenously given by (2-3) at an arbitrary level.  From (11-3) 
CG can affect k.  Namely,  if  ˆ p   is chosen to meet the following condition, 
  ˆ 1 p β =−         ( 1 2 )  
(5-4) is attained. Then, the marginal benefit of k is equal to the marginal cost of k for 
LG, and the first best level of k is attained. But, if k is given at the first best level 








cannot be changed any more by using the IGT parameter.   
Hence, optimality conditions (5-1) - (5-4) are not necessarily realized at the 
subgame perfect solution.    If β is too low, G1 and G2 are too high, while g1, g2, are too 
low (and vice versa).  In such a case, it would be desirable to raise a transfer from 
CG to LG in period 1 (and vice versa). However, this option is not available in our 
setting.  It is assumed that CG cannot choose  β  optimally.  In reality CG would 
have a difficulty of evaluating  12 () , () vg vg  perfectly at the beginning of period 1 
due to asymmetric information.  Our assumption of exogenously given β  may 
capture this reality. 
 
2.4.2.3  Game  II 
Second Stage 
  In Game II after CG knows  1 () vg  well, at the beginning of period 2 CG 
may not want to commit to the initial level ofβ .    CG may effectively change  β  by 
creating grants to LG ex post. Thus, LG faces the soft-budget constraint.  We first 
investigate the optimizing behavior of CG at the second stage of the game, which 
occurs at the beginning of the second period.  After LG determines local 
expenditures, g1 and k , in period 1, CG may effectively choose its public spending G2 
and g2 subject to the budget conditions (2-2) and (3-2) by creating an additional 
grant, A, appropriately in period 2.     
The budget constraint of the central government in period 2 is rewritten as 
  G2 + (1+ r )B = (1–β)Y2  A −      (2-2’) 
Similarly, the budget constraint of the local government in period 2 is rewritten as 
  22 (1 ) gr D Y A β ++ = +       (3-2)’ 
From (2-2’) and (3-2’) eliminating  A  gives the relevant overall budget constraint in 
period 2 as     12
  2 2 2 ) )( 1 ( Y D B r g G = + + + +       ( 1 3 )  
By choosing A e x  p o s t  i n  p e r i o d  2 ,  t h e  central government may in fact 
choose the allocation of G2 and g2 under the above overall constraint (13) to 
maximize the social welfare in period 2;.  22 () () uG vg + .  Thus, the first-order 
condition is given by 
  22 Gg uv =         (5-2) 
From the above optimality condition (5-2) and the budget constraints (2-2’), (3-2’), at 
given levels of local expenditures g1 and k, which are chosen in period 1, we may 
derive the optimal response of A, g2 (and hence G2) of the central government as 
functions of g1 and k, respectively.    
  1 (, ) AJ g k =         ( 1 4 - 1 )  
  21 (, ) gP g k =         ( 1 4 - 2 )  
Considering (3-1) and (7-1), D is determined by g 1 and k.  We have 
1 ˆ (1 ) dD dg p dk =+ − . By totally differentiating the budget conditions (2-2’) and (13) 
and the optimality condition (5-2), we have 
  22 1 ˆ (1 )( (1 ) ) ( ) dG dg r dg p dk f k dk ′ ++ + + − =  
  22 (1 )dG dg η η −=  
  2 (1 ) ( ) dG f k dk dA β ′ =− −  
where  η   22 2 /[ ] gg GG gg vu v ≡+  means the relative evaluation of G2 compared with 
g2.  It is assumed for simplicity that 01 η < <  is constant.  Then, considering 
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(1 )(1 ) r η −− + <0      (15-3) 
2 ˆ (1 )((1 )(1 ) ( )) k
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∂ ′ == − −+ − −
∂
     (15-4) 
As shown in (15-2), the sign of  k J   is generally ambiguous.    If 1–β > η, then  0 k J > .  
That is, if the marginal valuation of G2 is relatively small and 1–β is too high, g2 is 
too low compared with G2, and hence the central government would react to increase 
A in order to maximize social welfare.     
Intuition is as follows.  When k is increased by issuing more debt D, g2 is 
decreased from (3-2), which is not good for the central government since it would   13
like to realize the optimality condition (5-2) to raise social welfare.  Thus, the 
central government has an incentive to make additional subsidies to the local 
government in period 2 to raise the ex post level of g2.  We may call the case of 
0 k J >  the typical soft-budget case.  Moreover, (15-1) shows another outcome of 
the soft budget constraint.  An increase in  1 g  results in more grants A from the 
central government.  0 g J >  
  A key part of the model is the interaction between the central government 
and the local government.    The central government intends to allocate revenues to 
equalize marginal gains of public goods between the central and local governments.   
The central government’s benevolent incentives result in creating a soft budget 
constraint by creating additional grants in period 2 when the local government 
borrows more in period 1 because local borrowing more in period 1 means a decline 
in local public goods in period 2 and hence upsets the central government's optimal 
allocation strategy.  The central government intends to maximize the social 
welfare in period 2 by making additional grants in period 2 in response to local 
borrowing for more public investment and public goods in period 1.     
 
First Stage 
We now investigate the optimizing behavior of the local government at the 
first stage of Game II, which occurs at the beginning of period 1.  The local 
government's budget constraint (8) is effectively binding here only under the 
condition that the central government changes A in response to local expenditures 
of period 1, as summarized by equation (14-1,2).  Namely, the effective budget 
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   (16) 
The local government maximizes the objective function (1) subject to (16) at given 
levels of tax share parameter β, IGT parameter  ˆ p , and nation wide public goods, G1 
and  G2.  Actually, response functions (14-1,2) means that LG can affect G2 by 
choosing g1 and k. But we assume that LG always considers nation-wide public 
goods, G1 and G2 as given at its optimization.   
Therefore, the first order condition with respect to its policy variables, g1 
and k, are respectively given as follows, 
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     (17-2) 
where  ω  (>0) is the Lagrange multiplier of constraint (16).  Equations (17-1,2)   14
govern the allocation of g1 and k at a given level of tax share parameter  β  and  IGT 
parameter,  ˆ p . Substituting (15-1,3) into (17-1), we have 
  12 (1 )(1 ) gg vv r δ η =− +        (18-1) 
Thus, the optimality condition between  1 g  and  2 g  given by (5-3) is not realized 
here at the subgame perfect solution.  If CG did not make additional grants A, the 
optimizing behavior of LG could have attained condition (5-3) with respect to  1 g  
and  2 g . When LG takes into account the response functions of CG (14-1,2), it would 
effectively reduce the marginal cost of raising g1, stimulating g1 in period 1. (18-1) 
means that  1 g  is too high, compared with  2 g and G2.  An increase in  1 g  would 
result in an increase in A, which has a positive income effect on local expenditures. 
This is a plausible result of the soft budget constraint. 
  Next, substituting (15-2,4) into (17-2), we have 
  ˆ (1 )(1 ) ' rp f +− =       (18-2) 
Since the IGT parameter  ˆ p  is positive and less than 1, (18-2) means  1' rf +> . It 
follows that at the subgame perfect solution k is too high in Game II. 
 
2.4.2. Comments 
Several comments are useful.    First, in Game II LC is the leader and CG is 
the follower. We assume that IGT parameter  ˆ p   and public goods  1 G  are 
exogenously set at the levels given by solutions of Game I. In other words, CG does 
not change IGT parameter  ˆ p and public goods  1 G  given by Game I. In reality it is 
not easy to change IGT parameters often, which would likely be relevant in Japan’s 
case. Wildasin (1997) assumes the similar behavior of CG in his model of a game 
between CG and LG. 
Second, we could regard the second stage of Game II as the third stage of 
Game I. In such a case, as the first stage of Game II, we may consider an additional 
game, in which the central government now maximizes the national welfare (1) 
subject to its budget constraints (2-1,2), (7-1,2), and the response functions of local 
government based on (17-1,2) by choosing optimally IGT parameter,  ˆ p , as well as 
nation-wide public spending, G1, and public debt B  at the beginning of the first 
period.  It is interesting to note that CG cannot still attain the optimality 
conditions with respect to g1, g2 and k, (5-3) and (5-4) by setting the IGT parameter. 
And hence it cannot realize the overall optimality conditions given by (5-1,2,3,4).  
This is because (18-1) (18-2) always mean that g1 and k are too high.   
Third, welfare in Game II could be lower than welfare in Game I, 
depending on the initial size of β.    Due to the soft-budget constraint, 1 g   is too high. 
Also, k is too high and local public investment is done inefficiently.  We may say   15
that the soft-budget effect would stimulate inefficient local public expenditures. 
 
2.4.3 Soft Budget Problem 
We call Game I the hard-budget game, while Game II the soft-budget game.   
When the central government commits to a predetermined value of β as the leader 
of intergovernmental game between central and local governments, the local 
government is subject to the hard budget constraint.  However, in this case the 
central government may not attain the first best by choosing the IGT parameter 
appropriately unless β happens to be optimal. Considering asymmetric information 
of  12 () , () vg vg , the central government would not likely set β optimally from the 
beginning in reality even if it can choose  β . 
On the other hand, when the central government cannot commit to a 
predetermined value of  β  in period 2 and may add new grants A after the local 
government determines its expenditures, the local government is subject to the soft 
budget constraint.  Namely, when the local government raises local expenditures 
in period 1, the central government has an incentive to support such larger local 
expenditures by creating additional subsidies to the local government after the 
central government knows more about  1 () vg   in period 2.    It follows that in such a 
game the local government has a strong incentive to increase the local expenditures 
in period 1.    The central government may respond to such demand in period 2.    In 
Game II, the central government overthrows the commitment if the marginal 
valuation of G2 is relatively small and/or a predetermined level of tax share 
parameter  β  is too high at the subgame perfect solution. We have shown that in 
Game II the central government may have an incentive to make additional grant A 
in period 2 ex post and if so, in Game II k and g1 may well be too high.     
  Moreover we have shown the possibility of negative welfare effect of soft 
budget constraint.  While the hard budget constraint does not always attain the 
first best, the soft budget constraint may deteriorate social welfare by inducing 
inefficient expenditure due to an additional grant.  Our analytical result suggests 
that either constraint could be better or worse, depending of the initial level ofβ .  
If the hard budget constraint is too hard in the sense that  β  is too low compared 
with the first best solution, the soft budget outcome would be better, and vice versa. 
It should also be noted that if local public expenditures are too high in 
Game II, it would depress macroeconomic activities as well.    In such a case the rate 
of return on public expenditures becomes very low, resulting in lower GDP 
compared with the first best allocation. As to Japan’s case, local expenditures and 
grants from CG to LG actually increased in the 1990s.    If the bad outcome of Game 
II is more relevant with Japan's case than Game I, the soft budget constraint may 
produce serious problems to Japan's economy.  We would like to confirm this   16
conjecture by employing some empirical studies for Japan’s case.   
 
3. Japan's Intergovernmental Financing and Soft-Budget Problem 
3. 1 Fiscal Policy in the 1990s 
Before conducting empirical studies, let us briefly explain Japan’s fiscal 
policy and intergovernmental fiscal system.  After a "bubble economy" was broken 
in 1991, Japan did not grow much because of severe economic and financial 
situation.  Responding to political pressures of interest groups, the central 
government employed some measures for stimulating the aggregate demand. 
Namely, the Japanese government implemented increases in public investment 
(based on the traditional Keynesian counter-cyclical policy). However, these 
counter-cyclical measures were not so effective, resulting in an increase in the huge 
fiscal deficit.  According to previous studies, e.g. Ihori, Doi, and Kondo (2001) and 
Ihori, Nakazato, and Kawade (2003), Japan’s public investment, sharply increased 
in the early 1990s, was not effective to enhance economic growth.    Ihori and Kondo 
(2001) among others show that Japan’s public investment was over-provided in the 
recent years. It is one of reasons why “the Lost Decade” was triggered.     
Japan's central government provides heavy financial support to local 
governments, amounting to about 5% of GDP every fiscal year.  In the 1990s, the 
government deficits in Japan increased rapidly because local governments in the 
rural and agricultural area got a lot of transfers mainly in the form of public works.   
Agriculture-related public capitals and fishing ports and measures for flood control 
and conservation of forests were accumulated too much.    In comparison with other 
countries’ figures, we may say that local governments in Japan have larger 
privileges, wasteful local expenditures, than in other countries.         
 
3.2 Intergovernmental Financing 
The ratio of national taxes to local taxes within the total tax burden borne 
by Japanese citizens is approximately 2 to 1, but in order to achieve balanced 
finances among all prefectures, a fixed percentage of national taxes are provided as 
so called “The Local Allocation Tax (hereafter LAT)” Grants to local governments.  
The central government reserves a certain ratio of national tax revenue in the 
General Account as a common fund for local governments.    In the General Account 
of the central government, LAT Grants distribution amounts to a certain 
percentage of national tax revenues that are determined by the Local Allocation Tax 
Law.  It includes 32% of the revenue from the personal income tax and the liquor 
tax, 35.8% of the revenue from the corporate income tax and 29.5% of the revenue 
from the consumption tax, and 25% of the revenue from the tobacco tax. 
  The Grants for LAT are transferred from the General Account to the 
Special Account for Allocation and Transfer Taxes.  Then the LAT Grants are   17
allocated from the Special Account to local governments.  The central government 
distributes these funds to each local government according to its fiscal needs and 
local revenue sources, based on a detailed scheme determined by the central 
government (the Ministry of Home Affairs).     
 
3.3 Japan’s Soft-Budget Problem and LAT Grants 
In Japan’s case, in place of (7-1) and (7-2) we could specify the non-lump 
sum intergovernmental grant transfer structure (IGT) as an approximation of LAT 
grants as follows1 
  11 1 hg Y Z θβ ⋅− =      (7-1)’ 
  22 2 hg pk Y Z θβ ⋅+ ⋅ − =       (7-2)’ 
where h is coefficient for local public spending, p ˆ (1 ) rp ≡ +  is coefficient for public 
capital (investment expenditure), and θ is coefficient for local tax revenue ( t Y β ).  
In Japan’s case both  1 g h⋅  and  k p g h ⋅ + ⋅ 2  mean “Standard Fiscal Need” (SFN) 
in period 1 and period 2 respectively, and  t Y θβ means “Standard Fiscal Revenue” 
(SFR).  SFN is increasing with local expenditures, while SFR is increasing with 
local taxes. IGT Grants just cover the shortfall, SFN minus SFR. Thus, grants from 
the central government are increasing with local expenditures and decreasing with 
local  taxes.   
In Japan it is plausible to assume that the tax share (β) is exogenously 
given all through the analysis in order to explore the role of IGT system with the 
soft budget problem. In principle, as explained above, the supply side of IGT Grants 
is given by a portion of national taxes, which is determined by a national law.  
There is thus an exogenous limit on the size of transfer in each period,  12 , Z Z , 
respectively. 
  11 Z Z =          ( 1 9 - 1 )  
  22 Z Z =          ( 1 9 - 2 )  
Equations (19-1) and (19-2) are hard budget constraints.   
Since  h and θ  are now available in addition to p, CG can effectively 
change the allocation of public spending between CG and LG if it may choose  12 , Z Z  
as well.    Thus, we need the exogenously given limit on the size of transfers,  12 , Z Z . 
Otherwise, if CG can also choose  12 , Z Z  optimally at the first stage of the game, 
then the first best may be attained.  In order to make the comparison of the hard 
budget constraint and the soft budget constraint meaningful, we focus on the 
                                            
1 This specification of the formulation is empirically confirmed by Hayashi (2000) and 
Doi (2002) for Japan’s case.   18
second-best case where  12 , Z Z  are not optimally chosen. In reality CG may not 
have accurate information of v( ) at the beginning of period 1.    Our assumption that 
12 , Z Z  are not optimally chosen captures this aspect, and is relevant for Japan’s 
case.  
Also, we assume that LG does not take into account the constraints (19-1) 
and (19-2) at its optimization. Namely, LG does not think that it faces the ceiling 
constraint of  i Z  given by (19-1) and (19-2).  Rather, LG thinks that it can obtain 
grants as much as possible by raising local expenditures, gi and k, and local public 
debt, D, at given IGT parameters. Then the analytical results are qualitatively the 
same as in section 2.   
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Note that (3-1) is replaced by 
  1 1 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( Y k g h D β θ − − + − =  
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under the LAT Grant system.    Then, in place of (18-1) and (18-2) we have 
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The main difference occurs when we regard the second stage of Game II as 
the third stage of Game I. In such a case, if CG can choose  1 ˆ ,,, hp G θ , CG may 
attain the overall optimality conditions given by (5-1,2,3,4) by setting IGT 
parameters so that (18-1)’ and (18-2)’ are consistent with the first-best optimality 
conditions. However, in Game II we assume that IGT parameters  ˆ ,, hpθ  are 
exogenously set at the levels given by subgame perfect solutions of Game I. In 
Japan’s reality it is not easy to change IGT parameters often.     
Regarding the additional grant A, in Japan’s case if the central government 
intends to increase the LAT Grants ex post, it could raise the local allocation tax 
rate or increase the rates of national taxes themselves, and hence can raise the LAT 
Grants. It, however, would take some time to adopt these measures. In Japan’s case, 
the central government mainly increases borrowing at the Special Account of   19
Allocation and Transfer Taxes ex post facto, in response to excessive local 
expenditures by local governments.  When the central government is politically 
weak, such a response would be easier to take, but it would create a "soft budget" 
problem with LAT Grants. 
Local government bonds as well as national government bonds rapidly 
increased in the 1990s, as shown in Figure 1.  As the outstanding of local bonds 
increased from 52 trillion yen at the end of fiscal 1990 to 130 trillion yen at the end 
of fiscal 1999, borrowing of the Special Account for Allocation and Transfer Taxes 
increased.  This borrowing is incurred to spend LAT Grants.  The increase was 
from 1.5 trillion yen at the end of fiscal 1990 to 30 trillion yen at the end of fiscal 
1999.    By the end of fiscal 1999, the total outstanding of these bonds and borrowing 
was 506 trillion yen (from 222 trillion yen at the end of fiscal 1990).  Especially, 
borrowing of the Special Account for Allocation and Transfer Taxes was a peculiar 
phenomenon in the 1990s. 
  Local expenditures, mainly local public works, were heavily financed by 
local government bonds.  “Unsubsidized” local public investment, which was 
implemented by local governments based on LAT grants and debt issuance without 
receiving any matching grants from the central government, was dramatically 
expanded.  Ratio of total amount of local public investment (called it “ordinary 
construction expenses” in Japan’s local public finance) to GDP soared to the highest 
level (over 6%) in the second half of 20th century. 
  It should be noted that the central government admitted to issue these local 
bonds so that LAT Grants would also cover the resulting future repayment 
expenditure of these local bonds. 2    Local governments can raise funds for 
applicable projects even without sufficient repayment ability.  By doing so, they 
may enjoy the benefits of these public projects, while they do not have to pay for 
them, just depending on future national tax revenues, including tax revenues 
collected in other local governments (through the LAT Grants scheme) for debt 
repayment.3    Ratio of LAT Grants to cover local bonds repayment to those expenses 
on settlement basis increased in the 1990s.    Then it seems to trigger off an increase 
in LAT Grants, and lead to a further increase in borrowing for LAT Grants. 
  
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
                                            
2  Precisely speaking, Standard Fiscal Need, which explained below, includes repayment 
expenditure for depopulated area development bonds, revenue resource support bonds, 
and revenue decrease compensation bonds. 
3  Doi (2002a) theoretically examines economic aspects of this scheme. Sato (2002), Akai, 
Sato, and Yamashita (2003), and Akai (2006) theoretically and empirically described 
defects of LAT Grants. They explored the free-riding behavior among local governments 
in the LAT system.   20
4.1 Estimation 
  In this section, we investigate how serious the bad outcome of soft budget 
problem may be observed or not in Japan's Local Allocation Tax Grants.  In order 
to confirm empirically such a soft-budget phenomenon, it is important to note 
causality relationship between local expenditure and additional grants mainly by 
borrowing for LAT Grants in Japan’s case, theoretically explored in Section 2.  
When local governments increase expenditures, in particular inefficient public 
goods and investment, their fiscal shortfalls increase in the future.  When the 
central government could not commit to prohibiting borrowing at the Special 
Account for Allocation and Transfer Taxes to cover their shortfall, local 
governments intend to increase expenditures more. 
  Therefore, if we can observe the reaction functions (14-1,2), which mean 
that an increase in local expenditures leads to an increase in grants mainly in 
borrowing of the Special Account for Allocation and Transfer Taxes, we confirm the 
soft budget constraint with LAT Grants, and hence Game II would be relevant.    On 
the contrary, if we do not have such a causality relationship, then Game I would be 
relevant. 
  The Granger causality test using the conventional VAR analysis is 
adequate to confirm empirically the above relationship.  The similar Granger 
causality tests have been implemented in previous studies of revenue-expenditure 
nexus.  As an example in Japan’s case, Ihori, Doi, and Kondo (2001) and Doi and 
Ihori (2002) analyzed causalities between revenues and expenditures.  In this 
section we empirically study the soft budget constraint in Japan focusing mainly on 
borrowing of the Special Account for the Grants, which is the first attempt to verify 
soft budget problems in Japan. 
  We employ the following data.  First, data of Local Allocation Tax Grants, 
denotes Z, and the borrowing outstanding of the Special Account for Allocation and 
Transfer Taxes, denotes L, which is the accumulative sum of borrowing, can be 
collected from settlement statistics of the central government.  Since Japan’s local 
fiscal measures, explained in Section 3, are taken once a year, we collect these data 
annually.  We employ the data of local public investment from “Annual Report on 
National Accounts.”  Public investment (gross capital formation) of local 
governments, denotes k, is used.    Unfortunately, these data are available only since 
fiscal 1970.  Hence the sample period in this paper is restricted by one of these 
data.  Also since tax revenue is almost proportional to GDP, GDP is used as a 
proxy of Y in this analysis.    We use these variables deflated by these deflator. 
  According to the results of the augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root tests, the 
orders of integration of the four variables, lnL, lnY, lnZ, and lnk, are all one.    Hence, 
we can estimate the ordinal VAR model using first difference of these variables to 
implement the Granger causality test.    We analyze a VAR model with the following   21
four endogenous variables: ∆lnL,  ∆lnY,  ∆lnZ, and ∆lnk. Sample period is fiscal 
1975-2004.   
  Before estimating the VAR equation, we consider simultaneous effects of 
these variables.  In order to identify the VAR model, we implement block 
exogeneity tests of four variables.  Table 1, the result of the exogeneity tests, 
suggests that ordering the variables as {∆lnk, ∆lnZ, ∆lnL, ∆lnY}. 
  We estimate the VAR equation, which lag length equals two determined by 
the Schwarz criterion.  The result is reported in Table 2.  We then implement the 
Granger causality tests based on the Wald statistics from the OLS estimators.    The 
Wald statistics are reported in Table 3.  Figure 2 summarizes the results of the 
Granger causality tests in Table 3. 
  According to these Granger causality tests, we observe that causality from 
∆lnk to ∆lnL is strong.  From results in 5% significant coefficients in Table 3, an 
increase in local expenditures leads to an increase borrowing of the Special Account 
for Allocation and Transfer Taxes in the next year.     
  Incidentally, we observe also the causality from ∆lnY to ∆lnL.  A decline in 
GDP growth leads to an increase in the borrowing at the Special Account for 
Allocation and Transfer Taxes.  It suggests that when a decline in GDP growth 
reduces tax revenues, the central government responds to maintain or increase the 
amount of LAT Grants by using borrowing for the grants in spite of a decrease in 
tax revenues. From the theoretical analysis of section 2 it is easy to show that a 
decrease in  1 Y   would raise additional grants A in Game II.   
  Namely, if we consider a change in  1 Y   in Game II, we have 
  22 1 1 (1 )( ) dG dg r dY dY β ++ + − =  
  22 (1 )dG dg η η −=  
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which is likely negative. The above empirical finding is consistent with this 
analytical result. 
 
4.2 Impulse Response 
  In addition we estimate impulse response functions based on the above 
VAR model.  The estimated impulse responses to one standard deviation shock in 
the four variables VAR {∆lnk,  ∆lnZ,  ∆lnL,  ∆lnY} are reported in Figure 3.  The 
decomposition method is Cholesky's decomposition with degree of freedom 
correction.  The decomposition ordering is ∆lnk,  ∆lnZ,  ∆lnL, and ∆lnY.  Figure 3   22
displays the impulse response of ∆lnk to a one standard deviation shock in other 
variables in the VAR.  A shock of an increase in local public investment leads to 
increases in borrowing, Local Allocation Tax Grants, but a decrease in GDP growth.   
In other words, an increase in local public investment depresses GDP growth.     
  The above results suggest that borrowing for LAT Grants, which became 
larger in response to excessive local public investment caused by the soft budget 
constraint of local governments, aggravated Japan’s GDP growth. The soft budget 
constraint caused a lot of serious problems in Japan's economy. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we have investigated theoretically and empirically the 
soft-budget constraint with grants from the central government to the local 
government by clarifying the vertical externality of local expenditures due to 
overlapping tax bases between two governments using a two-period model.  The 
central government’s benevolent incentive results in creating a soft budget 
constraint by increasing grants when the local government spends and borrows 
more in period 1 because local borrowing more in period 1 means a decline in local 
public goods in period 2 and hence upsets the central government's optimal 
allocation strategy. We have shown the possibility of negative welfare effect of soft 
budget  constraint.   
If the hard budget constraint is too hard compared with the first best 
solution, the soft budget outcome would be better, and vice versa. Our analytical 
result means that either constraint could be better or worse, depending on the size 
of initial hard budget.    While the hard budget constraint does not always attain the 
first best, the soft budget constraint may well deteriorate social welfare by inducing 
an additional increase in transfers from the central government to the local 
government. It is interesting to note that, as far as the outcome of public investment 
is concerned, the size of public investment becomes too high and hence the soft 
budget problem exaggerates local expenditures.   
As to Japan’s case, productivity of public investment at the local level 
declined much in the 1990s. Section 4 has empirically shown that Japan's local 
governments actually implemented inefficient public investments due to the soft 
budget constraint, compatible with the analytical results in section 2. Local 
governments implemented inefficient local expenditures much. The soft-budget 
constraint is one of the reasons why GDP growth slowed down in the decade.     
In this paper we have not explicitly incorporated any political aspects to 
explain local governments’ aggressive behavior. Doi and Ihori (2002)’s empirical 
evidence indicates that lobbying activities of local interest groups was exaggerated 
in the 1990s.  Namely, an increase in local and/or national taxes resulted in an 
increase in subsidies of local interest groups.  If the marginal benefit of local   23
expenditures rises, it induces a further increase in lobbying activities to seek for 
more privileges and larger deficits, while it reduces national-wide public goods.  
Such movements were actually observed in the 1990s when the Japanese economy 
suffered from a slow-down of economic growth.  In short, under such a soft-budget 
constraint the financial resources needed by local governments are transferred from 
the central government to local governments in response to the demand of local 
governments. 
Incorporating political aspects into the theoretical model of 
intergovernmental finance would be a very useful extension for Japan’s case. Such 
an extension would reinforce the basic results of the present paper. Politically, more 
representatives in the ruling party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) for postwar 
period, have been seated for the rural regions.  People in the rural regions have 
more representatives in the ruling party than in the urban regions.  The ruling 
party exerts an influence to decide the national budget.    So the representatives for 
the rural regions, who are affected by local interest groups and voters, put political 
pressure to distribute more grants to the rural regions. Representatives of the Diet 
appeal to the cabinet or the central bureaucrats to distribute more in their own 
regions.  A region where more representatives in the ruling party are elected for 
did obtain more subsidies from the central government throughout the period.  
Allocation of region-specific privileges in the form of subsidies or public works from 
the central government has been mainly determined by the political factor. See 
Ihori and Itaya (2003). 
Finally, reforming the intergovernmental transfer system so that the 
central government can commit not to making additional grants is crucial for 
solving the bad outcome of soft budget problem.  Also it is useful to attain the 
desirable overlapping tax share in such a way that the central and local 
governments may collect taxes to finance their first-best levels of spending.   24
Appendix: Multiple local governments 
 
Suppose there are n local governments.  If we define the total amount of 
local public goods as  12 , gg  and each local government’s supply of public goods as 
12 ,
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The social welfare (1) is now rewritten as 
 
i W = 11 22 () () { () () }
ii uG vg uG vg δ ++ +      ( A 2 )  









  We may define other variables of local governments as in (A1). Then the 
budget constraints of CG and LG are the same as in the text.  For simplicity 
suppose all local governments are identical.    It follows that in the section of 2.2 the 
first best conditions are given by 
  11 g G vn u =         ( A 3 - 1 )  
  22 Gg un v =         ( A 3 - 2 )  
and (5-3)(5-4). (A3-1) and (A3-2) correspond to the well-known Samuelson condition 
of the pure public good, G. We have analytically the same results as in sections 2.3 
and 2.4.1.     
Regarding the game between CG and LG, we may assume that each LG 
behaves non-cooperatively and regards other LG’s choice variables given.  Then, 
the analytical results in section 2.4.2 are the same as in the text.    For example, (13) 
may be rewritten as 




j i = + + + + + + ∑ ∑
≠ ≠
     (A4) 
Then, central government’s response functions are given as 
  1 (,)
ii i i AJ g k =         ( A 5 - 1 )  
  21 (,)
ii i i gP g k =         ( A 6 - 2 )  
Similarly, we have 
22 1 ˆ (1 )( (1 ) ) ( )
ii i i i dG dg r dg p dk f k dk ′ ++ + + − =  
  22 (1 )
i dG dg ηη −=  
  2 (1 ) ( )
ii i dG f k dk dA β ′ =− −  
Hence, we have (15-1,2,3,4) as in the text. 
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Table 1 
 
Block Exogeneity Tests 
Wald statistics 
 
∆lnk  4.111 (0.662) 
∆lnZ  5.917 (0.433) 
∆lnL  17.369 (0.008) 
∆lnY  17.757 (0.007) 
 
     The  above  parentheses  indicate  the  p-values of the hypothesis: All coefficients 
with respect to other endogenous variables equal zero. 
   28
Table 2 
Estimation of the VAR 
1975-2004 
 
   Dependent  variable: 
  ∆lnkt ∆ lnZt  ∆lnLt  ∆lnYt 
      
∆lnkt-1  0.398 0.452 0.974 0.075 
  (1.745) (1.754) (0.700) (1.455) 
∆lnkt-2  -0.271 -0.361  3.123 -0.039 
  (-1.090) (-1.283)  (2.054) (-0.698) 
∆lnZt-1  -0.130 -0.009 -1.014  0.110 
  (-0.607) (-0.038) (-0.774)  (2.264) 
∆lnZt-2  -0.020 -0.172 -2.220 -0.004 
  (-0.091) (-0.688) (-1.640) (-0.071) 
∆lnLt-1  0.006 -0.033 -0.254 -0.010 
  (0.202) (-0.957) (-1.368) (-1.457) 
∆lnLt-2  0.025 0.008  -0.286 0.016 
  (1.072) (0.303)  (-1.972) (2.917) 
∆lnYt-1  0.656 1.266  -11.927 0.076 
  (0.830) (1.419)  (-2.474) (0.424) 
∆lnYt-2  1.032 -0.628 -0.888 -0.273 
  (1.200) (-0.646) (-0.169) (-1.407) 
intercept 0.062  0.039  2.246  0.071 
  (0.732) (0.414) (4.364) (3.726) 
t -0.039  0.016  -0.330  -0.019 
 (-1.232)  (0.440) (-1.689) (-2.635) 
t2  0.00447 -0.00416  0.01188  0.00291 
 (1.001)  (-0.826) (0.436) (2.885) 
t3  -0.00018 0.00027 0.00023  -0.00016 
 (-0.770)  (1.050)  (0.167) (-3.077) 
      
  log of likelihood function  203.925 
     Schwarz  criterion  -7.700 
      
     std. err. of 
regression 0.056 0.063 0.343 0.013 




Granger causality tests 
Wald statistics 
 
   Independent  variables   
   ∆lnk ∆ lnZ ∆ lnL ∆ lnY 
  ∆lnk  -- 0.370  1.170  2.027 
    (0.831)  (0.557)  (0.363) 
∆lnZ  3.730 --  1.043  2.539 
 (0.155)   (0.594)  (0.281)  Dependent 
variable  ∆lnL  6.054 3.051  --  6.120 
   (0.048)  (0.218)   (0.047) 
  ∆lnY  2.199 5.226  11.136  -- 
   (0.333)  (0.073)  (0.004)   
 
 
          The above parentheses indicate the p-values of the hypothesis: The 
independent variable does not Granger-cause the dependent variable. 
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Figure 1 
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Figure 3 
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Cholesky Ordreing: ∆lnk, ∆lnZ, ∆lnL, ∆lnY 
 